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SEVERAL OBSERVERS
STATE THAT CHINESE
ACTIVITIES ARE
REINFORCING THE
MANIFOLD OF
INEQUALITIES THAT
ALREADY EXIST BETWEEN
ISLAMABAD AND THE
PROVINCES IN ALL
SPHERES OF STATE
AND SOCIETY
trategic analysts are
paying more and more
attention to China’s
growingactivities inPakistan
whichhavebeen increasingly
worrying the international
community since the last few
years. Having maintained a
rather ‘behind-the-scenes’
support for Islamabad for
decades, today Beijing is
exercising its influencemore
publicly.
Generally, Pakistan and
China share a relatively long
relationship. Inotherwords,
since Pakistan came into
existence in 1947 it kept a
close diplomatic eye on
China. Faced with the need
for allies as a result of the
confrontation with India,
Pakistan became the first
Islamic country to recognize
the People’s Republic of
China in1950 (oneyear after
India). The Pakistanis also
voted in favour of granting
China a seat in the United
Nations and sided with
Beijing in the then newly
appeared issuesoverTaiwan
and Tibet. This marked the
beginning of mutually sup-
portive relations,whichcon-
siderably increasedafter the
Sino–IndiaWarof1962.Since
then, Pakistan and China
have regularly exchanged
high-level visits resulting in
numerous agreements. For
example, both countries
resolved their border dis-
putes, signingaborderagree-
ment in 1963, to the dismay
of the Indian government
which accused Pakistan of
illegally ceding territory of
Pakistan-administered
Kashmir to China.
Furthermore,bothcountries
startedcooperating inmajor
development projects on
Pakistani soil, most note-
worthy of which is the con-
struction of the 1,200 km-
long Karakorum Highway,
the highest international
road connecting China and
Pakistan.This infrastructure
project is not only of enor-
mous commercial but also
tremendous strategic value,
especially for Beijing. In this
contextoneshouldstate that,
the ongoing Gwadar port
project on theMekran coast
in the province of
Balochistan is another
remarkable example that
showcases theway inwhich
China combines develop-
ment projects with clear
strategic and security inter-
ests.However, it alsodemon-
strated thedisturbing impact
Chinese enterpriseshaveon
Pakistan’spolitical andsocio-
economic developments.
Regarding the negative
effects on the political land-
scape, severalobservers state
that Chinese activities are
reinforcing the manifold of
inequalities thatalreadyexist
between Islamabad and the
provinces in all spheres of
stateandsociety.There is ris-
ingcriticismamong thepeo-
ple ofBaluchistanandother
regions like Gilgit-Baltistan,
that they get systematically
excluded from decision-
making inmatters regarding
their own land and are
deprivedofa fair shareof rev-
enues from their resources.
In Baluchistan, sentiments
of neglect and exclusion are
gaining momentum as the
local population increasing-
ly feels exploited from two
sides; the government in
Islamabad and increasingly
through Chinese develop-
ments activities. The recent
transfer of management of
Gwadar from Singapore’s
PSA International to the
state-ownedChinaOverseas
port Holding company on
January 30, 2013, is paradig-
matic for several reasons.
First, regarding Balochi
criticism, the transfer is
unconstitutionalbecause the
decision was made in
Islamabad and not by the
Council ofCommonInterest
(CCI) which would include
the provinces (Chief
Ministers) in the decision-
making process, a require-
ment following the 18th
Amendment. Article 154 (1)
of theconstitutionstates that
major ports, as listed in Part
II (5) of the Federal
Legislative List, are a subject
in the domain of CCI.
Therefore, it is arguedby the
antagonists of the transfer
that the exclusion of the
Baloch from the transfer of
Gwadar to the Chinese is a
breach of constitutionally
guaranteed provincial deci-
sion-makingpower.Thegov-
ernment, in response, claims
that for the very same rea-
son, i.e. the fact thatGwadar
is aport, it automatically falls
under the authority of the
Ministry of Ports and
Shipping in Islamabad and
therefore is not of any con-
cern to a provincial govern-
ment – a legal technicality
that is highly debatable.
Clearly, this is a case that
needsunbiasedclarification
by the Supreme Court. But
here thequestionariseshow
far theSupremeCourt iswill-
ing to go. A verdict that chal-
lenges the transferwouldnot
only provoke the execu-
tive/government,whichcon-
ducted the deal, and the
armedforces,whicharehop-
ing to improve their navy
base facilities, but also the
national establishment in
general of whose members
includemostof the judiciary
which. In thepast, it seemed
that the judges were busier
withmatters relating to their
own cause -especially when
it comes to improving their
status in the political power
structure of the country-
instead of taking care of the
concerns of the provinces.
Suchmatterswould include
strengthening federalism,
revenue distributions, pro-
tection of minorities, tack-
ling religious fundamental-
ism, education, and corrup-
tion. It will be interesting to
observe to which extent the
constitution is used by the
SupremeCourt as an instru-
ment in its attempt to keep
theexecutiveandthesoldiers
in check or to enhance the
stability of the political sys-
tem as well as to grant all
people inPakistan their legit-
imate rights, even if it is
against thepartial interest of
the ‘own folks’. The Baloch
leaders want to rely on the
constitution inorder to solve
the Gwadar problem and
related issues. No matter
what the Supreme Court’s
actions will be, the transfer
hasonceagainenhanced the
impression among many
Baloch that Islamabad is
doing everything to ensure
and protect Chinese inter-
ests in their province at the
locals’ expense.
Second, based on the
assessments of several
Baloch groups and interna-
tional observers it has
become increasingly appar-
ent that there is a strongcor-
relation between Chinese
activities in Pakistan and
human rights violations.
There are strong indications
that in order to protect
Chinese interests in
Balochistan, Islamabad and
its security apparatus won’t
hesitate to apply extra-legal
measures to eliminate any
opposition towardsChinese
activities in the region.
According to international
human rights reports, vari-
ous kinds of repressive tac-
tics are applied including
abductions, arbitraryarrests,
torture, andunlawfulkillings.
Some of the latest dramatic
examples of ‘kill and dump’
activities were Mehboob
Wadela and Arif Rehman,
bothkey figures in theBaloch
movementwhowere critical
of China’s role and presence
in Balochistan. It comes as
no surprise for many unbi-
ased Baloch experts, that
these crimes are committed
with ‘flagrant impunity’.
Journalistswhoare trying to
shed light on these occur-
rences are frequently sub-
jects of so-called ‘target
killings’.Having this inmind,
theproclaimed‘newfreedom
of press’ in Pakistan needs a
careful assessment when it
comes to provinces in
Pakistan in which China
exercises its interests. It
seems that theChinesedon’t
mind oppression of the
Baloch movement because
theyposea threat toChinese
workers in the region,
Chinese commercial and
security interests. The latter
relates to Beijing’s fear of
spill-over of secessionist-
driven instability in its own
troubledXinjiang region.An
independent Balochistan
wouldmost likely embolden
independence movements
in territories under China’s
control.
Third,Chineseactivities in
Pakistan have severe impli-
cations for the latter’s civil-
military relations. After the
ousting of Pakistan’s latest
military ruler, Pervez
Musharraf, and the subse-
quent elections in 2008, it
seemed that the troubled
civil-military relations were
improving. At least, there
were rudimental signs that
civilians were trying to
reclaim decision-making
power in a significant num-
ber of policy fields, which
had traditionally beendom-
inated by the all-powerful
army.However, since January
last year after a six-day visit
of General Kayani in Beijing
the Chinese started a policy
of boosting the image of the
army by emphasizing the
contribution of the soldiers
for strengthening the strate-
gic tiesandcooperativepart-
nershipbetweenbothcoun-
tries and appreciating the
tremendous efforts of the
armed forces in fighting ter-
rorism.This is a clear indica-
tion that the Chinese are
quite comfortable with a
Pakistani military being in
chargeof strategic and secu-
rity related aspects of gover-
nance.This isnot anewphe-
nomenon, it canbeobserved
in China’s relations with
states where it deems the
army the most reliable and
influential political actor. In
spite of the fact that China
has refrained issuing official
statements that could be
interpreted as its sidingwith
the Pakistani army, it is dis-
turbing the civil-military
equation in Pakistan.
Undoubtedly, this is to the
detriment of the decision-
making ability of civilians.
The exercise to build up the
soldier’s prestige and crucial
role in strategic affairs is cre-
ating a political climate in
which itwill be easier for the
army toundermine theposi-
tion of the democratically
elected political leaders as
supremeauthority in all pol-
icy fields. In other words,
China is indirectly support-
ing thenotion that decisions
in strategicandsecuritymat-
ters should be reserved
domains for the soldiers. In
consequence, this is chal-
lenging thenotionof civilian
control of themilitarywhich
is a necessary ingredient for
liberal democracy and its
consolidation.
Forth, in the recent years,
itwasobvious thatChinawas
holding back to initiate new
mega project in Balochistan
becauseof the instability and
threats towards Chinese
workers inBalochistan. Itpre-
ferred to extend its engage-
ments in Pakistan to ‘safer’
areas like Gilgit-Baltistan
were the Islamabad has
granted Chinese companies
numerous mining licences
and the permission to build
up all necessary infrastruc-
ture for theexploitationof the
region. Also here, Islamabad
did not deem it essential to
consult the local people and
institutions.
But it is important to note,
that China’s scepticism in
Pakistan’s military capabili-
ties to suppress the Baloch
nationalmovementwas cer-
tainly encouraging Baloch
militants as well as political
leaders to continue their
struggle.
However, the currentmas-
sive moral, diplomatic and
material support by the
Chinese for Pakistan’s army
will not help to convince
Islamabad to look for apolit-
ical solution and to continue
the repressive tactics of the
past in Balochistan. In con-
trast, it will further enhance
the unwillingness of the
national elite to implement
policy inaccordancewith the
‘ A g h a z - H u q o o q - i -
Balochistan’ (the Beginning
ofRightsofBalochistan).This
so called ‘Balochistan
Package’ was supposed to
reduce the sense of depriva-
tion and alienation and to
ensure political, economic,
and cultural rights for the
Balochi.
Besides these dramatic
impacts on the political
sphere, China’s role in
Pakistan is responsible for far-
reachingsocio-economicdis-
tortions in the country too.
Here tooagainGwadar serves
as anextraordinary example.
Basically there is a general
consensus that Gwadar is a
non-starter until today.
Islamabadhasput theblame
of Gwadar’s disappointing
performance on the Balochi
insurgents andon the former
port authority, PSA
International fromSingapore.
However, onemajor causeof
commercial failure, namely
lacking road and rail con-
nections and theomission to
establish a special economic
zone, can hardly be blamed
upon the Singaporeans. In
fact, the acquisition of land
that is necessary for the con-
struction if such vital infra-
structurewasblockedbycivil-
ian and/or military authori-
ties. Hence, the accusation
fromIslamabad that the local
political opposition andmil-
itant insurgencies are largely
responsible forGwadar’s eco-
nomic difficulties lacks sub-
stance and is a distortion of
facts, causes and conse-
quences. If theestablishment
would grant the Baloch their
legitimate political rights,
introduce an appropriate
mechanism of sharing the
revenuesof resourcesexploit-
ed in Balochistan, and
enhancing localownership in
development projects, there
would be most likely much
fewer objections against
Gwadar. But Islamabad
appearsnot tohaveusedany
of these options in its policy
approach towards
Balochistan and other
regions. In contrast, the fed-
eral government worsened
the situationby issuingwork
permits and licenses for the
Chinese. As a result, Gwadar
andotherChineseprojects in
the country are not creating
anoteworthyamountof jobs
for theunemployedPakistani
youth.
Additionally, instead of
pushing joint ventures with
local entrepreneurs foreign
companies get favored sig-
nificantly. Consequently, the
Baloch get no fair access to
business and job opportuni-
ties in their own province.
Andas if thiswerenotalready
enough, the Baloch are get-
ting more afraid to be con-
frontedwithenhanced‘guid-
edmigration’. Inotherwords,
Islamabad is encouraging
workers fromPunjaborSindh
to settledown inBalochistan,
and especially in Gwadar, to
takeover the jobs that are left
to Pakistanis. With the
Chinese takeover thisprocess
willmost likelybeenhanced.
To sum up, China’s activi-
ties in Pakistan have an
extraordinary influence on
thecountry’sdomesticdevel-
opment, in political and
socio-economic terms. But
most important is the high
leverage into the decision-
making process dominated
by the country’s establish-
ment, represented by the
civilians in Islamabadandthe
military top brass in
Rawalpindi. Having this in
mind, anextremelyworrying
factor for the people in the
regions is, that a country
which is perceived critically
bymost of international sur-
veys -China is for example
categorized as ‘not free’ by
FreedomHouse-has suchan
extent of influence on
Pakistan which is still strug-
gling to establish a sustain-
abledemocraticorder.This is
gaining significance, since
there is todayarisingdemand
of the people towards the
establishment of a function-
ing democracy. But taking
into account the deplorable
stateofhumanrights and the
authoritarianstyleofChinese
governments, there is no
doubt thatChina isnot inter-
ested in supporting any
improvements in this direc-
tion in its neighborhood,
especially not in Pakistan.
Being able to establish cor-
dial working relationships
with Pakistan’s various mili-
tary regimes (or military
backed and controlled civil-
ian governments) and bene-
fiting from their respective
options to enforce major
development projects such
as sidelining regions in deci-
sion-making, use of force in
suppression of oppositional
movements, there might be
not much interest by China
in enhancing any democrat-
ic transition.
In consequence, the phe-
nomenon of hampering
democracy through outside
powers, which started with
themilitary-to-military-con-
tact based US-Pakistan rela-
tions would be just contin-
ued by an autocratic guided
development policy pushed
by China’s economic inter-
ests. In sum, the Chinese
activity in Pakistan makes it
moredifficult to restorepeace
and stability in the country.
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ver the past 10 years,
significant achieve-
ments have been
madebyanumberoforgan-
izations implementing pro-
motional safety nets for the
ultra-poor inBangladesh.All
theseprojects targetwomen
andarebasedonasset trans-
fers – either direct transfers
or cash grants for invest-
ment. Some include addi-
tional monthly allowances
to support basic family
needs while their invest-
ments grow enough to yield
returns.
A key distinguishing fea-
ture of all the programmes
is theuseofgrants,not loans,
to give ultra-poor women a
real chance to change their
future. The use of a grant
gives the boost they need
without the danger micro-
credit poses to families vul-
nerable to shocks and the
potential of resulting cycles
of debt.Womenare targeted
for the same reasons that
have emerged from the
experience of micro-credit:
theyare themaincaretakers
of the family, they stay in the
villagewhenmenmigrate in
searchof incomeandbetter
opportunities, and theygen-
erally spend income wisely.
The grants bring extra
responsibility towomen,but
they also bring significant
opportunities.Acrossallpro-
grammes and models,
women have become more
empowered. Participants in
WFP’s EU-funded Food
Security for the Ultra Poor
(FSUP)projectwereprovid-
edwith training inentrepre-
neurial skills, incomegener-
ating activities, disasterpre-
paredness and nutrition. To
put this knowledge into
action, ultra-poor women
received a 14,000 taka cash
grant, andanadditional 500
taka each month over two
years to meet their basic
family needs. This enabled
them to secure three meals
a day, invest in trade and
other productive assets for
both themselves and their
husbands, andprioritise the
educationof theirdaughters
and sons.
These women who were
onceshyandsubmissive, are
now confident and articu-
late. They are involved in
their communities through
group formation and regu-
lar meetings, and draw
strength from one another.
Some have even coura-
geously and successfully
entered local politics, win-
ning landslide victorieswith
the support of their peers.
This transformation from
‘ultra-poor woman’ to suc-
cessful entrepreneur, and
then politician, is an
astounding achievement.
Even the more modest suc-
cesses achieved, however,
are to be celebrated. The
30,000FSUPwomenpartic-
ipants have all undertaken
successful investments and
reinvestments, growing their
income and improving the
food security of their fami-
lies.
Theprojecthas in thisway
lifted 150,000 people out of
extreme poverty. Models
implementedbyotheragen-
cies followsimilarapproach-
es and have seen similar
transformations in the lives
ofparticipant families.There
will be follow-up undertak-
en to examine the sustain-
ability of this success, but all
signs point to long-lasting
change.
As the government devel-
ops its social protection
framework and strategy, we
believe promotional safety
nets should feature strong-
ly. While protective pro-
grammes (and programme
components)will always be
necessary – particularly in a
countryprone tonaturaldis-
asters such as Bangladesh –
promotional programmes
that givewomen the chance
to lift their families out of
extreme poverty should
receive equal attention.
Established government
programmes, such as the
long-standing Vulnerable
Group Development pro-
gramme, which assists
750,000 women every two
years, couldprovidean ideal
platform on which govern-
ment could build further
promotional safetynetmod-
els.
Further impact could be
achieved through the addi-
tion of behavioural change
messages on improved
maternal, infant, andyoung
child feeding practices. In a
countrywhere fouroutof ten
children under five years of
age still suffer fromstunting
(chronicmalnutrition), these
messages are a priority. The
mainstreaming of nutrition
intopromotional safetynets
would allow participants,
primarily reproductive aged
women, not only to receive
a much needed income
boost, but to learn about
proper nutrition practices.
With a higher andmore sta-
ble income, these families
are inaprimeposition toput
this new knowledge into
practiceandchange thestate
of child nutrition in
Bangladesh.
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Empowering women - a way forward that works
